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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

D.D.B. (Mother) in the interest of
G .J.C. (Child),
A child under 18 years of age.

GUARDIAN AD LITEM
RESPONSE BRIEF.
Juv. No. 1083532
App. No: 20150432-CA

D.D.C. (Mother),
Appellant,
vs.
J.L.C. (Father),
Appellee.

Martha Pierce, Attorney Guardian ad Litem for the minor Child, responds to
Mother's Petition on Appeal and concedes the juvenile court erred as a matter oflaw in
its best interest analysis.
JURISDICTION

Section 78A-4-l 03(2)( c) provides this Court statutory jurisdiction over appeals from
final orders of the juvenile court. Mother timely filed her May 22, 2015 notice of appeal
from the juvenile court's May 15, 2015 final order.

ISSUES

1. Whether the juvenile court erred in relying on section 78A-6-503 to analyze best
interest when that section does not go to best interest. This issue is one of statutory
interpretation, which this Court independently reviews. In re H.J, 1999 UT App
238,, 15, 986 P.2d 115.
2. Whether the juvenile court erred in relying on inappropriate factors to determine
best interest. This issue is one of law which this Court independently reviews. In
re H.J, 1999 UT App 238 at iJ 15.

3. Whether the juvenile court erred in relying on inappropriate factors to determine
best interest. This issue is one of law which this Court independently reviews. In
re HJ., 1999 UT App 238 at~ 15.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Controlling provisions including Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-503 and -507(1 ), each
of which is included in the Addendum to Mother's Brief.

PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
Mother appeals a juvenile court order denying her petition to terminate Father's
parental rights. The juvenile court found five separate grounds to terminate, but denied
the petition based on lack of best interests.

RELEVANT FACTS
This brief does not challenge the juvenile court's oral and written factual findings,
but argues that the juvenile court erred in its choice of findings to rely on to determine
best interests. The juvenile court's oral and written findings, as they stand, can support
only a best-interest determination. For purposes of this appeal, this brief adopts those
written and oral findings. See Addendum.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The best-interest analysis considers the impact of termination on the child's best
interests. In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ii 12,257 P.3d 1062. Generally, once a court
finds grounds, it has little wiggle room to determine no best interests to terminate. Id. at~

2

27. Such cases are rare. Id. at ,r 35 (Orme, J., concurring specially). This case is not
among those rare cases.
Here, the juvenile found five separate grounds to terminate, but determined it
could not find best interests. The juvenile court erred in its choice of findings to rely on to
determine best interests. The juvenile court's oral and written findings as they stand can
support only a best-interest determination.

The juvenile court erroneously relied on section 78A-6-503 to determine best
interests. Section 78A-6-503 codifies language from three major cases, Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1988), and Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120

S. Ct. 2054 (2000), and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), all of which go to a
parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care, control and custody of that parent's child
and to reasonable efforts.

The juvenile court relied on inappropriate factors in its best-interest analysis. Those
factors include: Mother's single status, Mother having once relied on state assistance,
Child's lack of detriment or damage, grandparent visitation~ and actions taken earlier by
the divorce court.
Many of the juvenile court's findings addressed section 78A-6-509 and -510 bestinterest factors including the Child's physical, mental or emotional needs and conditions;
the parent's efforts to adjust circumstances leading to the Child not living with him; the
3

parent's financial support, maintenance of parent-time and maintenance of custodial
communication; the love, affection, permanence, commitment, and stability of the
Child's intended family; and the intended family's ability to integrate the Child into their
home and to treat Child as a permanent family member. Despite having made findings
going to those considerations, the juvenile court failed to weigh them in its best-interest
analysis. The juvenile court's findings, as they stand, can support only a best-interest
determination. This Court should therefore remand this case with instructions to the
juvenile court to enter a best-interest determination and to grant the termination petition

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON SECTION 78A-6-503 TO

DETERMINE BEST INTEREST .
The juvenile court erred in relying on section 78A-6-503 to determine best
interests analysis because that section goes to a parent's fundamental liberty interests and
not to best interest. This Court independently reviews issues of statutory interpretation. In
re HJ, 1999UT'App238,115,986P.2d 115.

The 2005 Amendment. In 2005, Representative La Var Christensen sponsored
House Bill 33 8, which codified language from three major cases into section 62A-4a-201
of the Human Services Code. 2005 Utah Laws CH. 304 (H.B. 338). The three cases were:
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1988), Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.

57,120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Utah 1988). Each case
emphasized the fundamental liberty of a parent in the care, custody and control of his or
4

her child. 1 Representative Christensen argued to the House Floor that his will would
result in no substantive changes because it served only to codified existing case law.
Placing the language from the three cases in the Human Services could would make it ore
likely that practitioners would rely on that language. See 2005 Utah Laws Ch. 304 (H.B.
338), House Floor Video Day 38, 2005 Gen. Sess. Part 2 at Part 2. 2

The 2012 Amendment. In 2012, Representative Christensen introduced a bill that would
include similar language into sections 78A-6-503 and 507 of the Judicial Code. 3 2012 Utah Laws
Ch. 281 (H.B. 161). Representative Christensen's hour-long presentation made to the February
23, 2012 House Judiciary Committee emphasized his concern that Utah judges and practitioners
were still not relying on language from Santosky, Troxel, and In re J.P. 4 Representative

Christensen again emphasized that his bill would make no substantive changes and would
only codify existing case law. Representative Christensen's intent was that this language

1

~

Significantly, in 1982, the year both Santosky and In re J.P. were decided, Utah law
already conformed to their holdings. In fact, Santosky cited favorably to Utah law
requiring clear and convincing evidence to support termination orders. 455 U.S. at 750
n.3. Moreover, while the In re J.P. case was pending before the Utah Supreme Court, the
Legislature amended Utah law to clarify that a termination order must be based on
unfitness as well as best-interests alone. In re J.P., 649 P.2d at 1369.
2

http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id= 10 l 98&meta id=446335.

Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-503(1) with Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (both
referring to the parent's right to care, custody, companionship and management of the
parent's child); compare Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-503(4) with Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753
(parent's fundamental right does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents or have lost temporary custody); compare Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-503(6) with
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (parent and child cannot be presumed adversaries until parental
presumption rebutted by unfitness).
3

4

http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id= 1087 &meta id=4 l 674.
5

would be in the Utah code "right there staring you in the face" and thus "we would not
have to run the risk that the research did not go far enough. ,~ 5
In his 2005 and 2012 presentations, Representative Christensen spoke only in the
context of state-initiated cases, arguing that a parent's constitutional rights should be
emphasize to counter balance the powers of the State. 6 Both times, Representative
Christensen quoted that Santosky passage that the state's resources "almost inevitably
dwarfs the parents' ability to mount a defense." 455 U.S. at 763.
Representative Christensen's 20 I 2 bill also included language from the Fostering
Connections Act to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Fostering
Connections). Pub. L. No. 110-351 § 201, 122 Stat. 3949 (2008) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
675) to emphasize the Division's duty to provide in-home services and to place with kin.

See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-503( I 0)( d) ("The interests of the state favor
preservation and not severance of natural familial bonds in situations where a positive,

5

Representative Christensen's fears seem to be unfounded, at least as far as Utah
appellate courts are concerned. As of this writing, Utah appellate courts have cited to the
1982 Santosky thirty-three times, to the 1982 In re JP. case seventy times, and to the
2000 Troxel case fifteen times.
6

The language of section 78A-6-503 also suggests it is directed primarily toward stateinitiated cases. E.g., "... (I) For this reason, the termination of family ties by the state
may only be done for compelling reasons .... (3) If the party moving to terminate
parental rights is a governmental entity, . .. (6) Prior to an adjudication of unfitness,
government action in relation to a parent ... ( I 0)(b) the state's role is secondary and
supportive to the primary role of a parent.. . . ( d) The interests of the state favor
preservation and not severance of natural familial bonds in situations where a positive,
nurturing parent-child relationship can exist, including extended family association and
support." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-503.
6

nurturing parent-child relationship can exist, including extended family association and
support."). His desire was that the Division would first provide in-home services, move to
voluntary kinship care and "go to the government last."
Here, the juvenile court peppered its best-interest analysis phrases from section
78A-6-503. Specifically, the juvenile court considered detriment or damage from
subsection 503(7); 7 reasonable efforts to preserve nurturing relationships from
subsections 503( 6), (8), ( 10)( d), and (12); 8 compelling reason to interfere in family life
from subsections 503( 1), (6), (8); 9 the need to preserve and to rely on "family life,"

7

See e.g., tr. 468: 13-14 ("absence of testimony ... as to what psychological damage ...
this child may be experiencing"); id. 4 71 :24-25; 4 72: 1-6. ("I didn't hear any evidence of
actual physical abuse ... I didn't hear any evidence to suggest the child is suffering
from some type of psychological detriment."); id. 4 72: 17-18 ("I'm not sure what sort of
psychological damage ... he's suffering at this stage"); id. 4 73 :7-10 (supervised
visitation was not because "of any direct abuse or damage to the child."); id. 4 78: I 0-12
("We have an extended family here who has not proven to be any direct detriment to
this child."); id. 4 78:21-23 ("no evidence presented that this child was actually suffering
any psychological damage."; id. 4 79: 1-4 ("no "reason to terminate Dad's rights if this
child is not suffering that detriment." ).
8

See e.g., tr. at 475:1-3 (quoting from subsection 503(10)(d); id. at 478:3-5 ("I do,
however, believe that this child could benefit from a positive, loving, nurturing
relationship with his extended family."); id. 478: 13-16 ("will Dad able to have that
positive, loving, nurturing relationship with this child? I don't know. But what the
statute says is that that relationship can exist. 8 And I think we have to believe it
can."); id. 474:24-25; (the interests of the Sate favors preservation."); id. 475:6-8 ('-You
have a lot of work to do"); id. 4 78: 15-18 (the statute says "we have to believe" Dad is
capable of a positive, loving, nurturing relationship); id. at 4 79: 14-16 ("Dad, you've got
a lot of freakin' work to do.").
9

See e.g., tr. 479:3-4 ("I don't find that there's any compelling reason to terminate Dad's
rights").
7

"extended family ties, support" from subsections 503(1), (5), (8), (IO)(d), (12); 10 and
fundamental liberty interest and parental presumption from subsections 503( 1), (3 ), (4),
(7), (9), (l0)(c). 11

Each of these phrases goes to grounds and reasonable efforts and not to best
interests. Thus the juvenile court erred in relying on this language in its best-interest
analysis. This Court should deem that the findings as they stand support a best-interest
determination. Finally, this Court should remand with instructions to grant the
termination petition.

2. THE JUVENILE COURT RELIED ON INAPPROPRIATE FACTORS TO
DETERMINE BEST INTEREST.
The juvenile court's best-interest analysis relied on factors rejected by this Court.
Those factors include Mother's single parent status; Mother having once relied on state
assistance; Child not showing damage or detriment from Father's unfitness~ grandparent
visitation; and the divorce court not having suspended Father's visitation. Whether a

10

See e.g., tr. 4 77 :23-25 ("it is a matter of policy in the state that a child have two
parents"); id. 4 78:6-7 ("having that second family in his life would be in his best
interests."); id. 478:10-12 ("we have an extended family here ... "); id. 478:17-18 ("'I do
know that [positive relationship] can exist ... with his extended family."): id. 478: 18-20
("I think terminating the possibility for that [extended family] relationship would be
contrary to [Child's] best interest.").
11

See e.g., tr. 474:11-12 ("the fundamental liberty interest of a parent,"); id. 474: 16-18
(court may not presume parent and child are adversaries); id. 475:7-8 ("You are not a
model parent.").
8

factor is pertinent to a best-interest determination is one of law which this Court
independently reviews. In re HJ, 1999 UT App 23 8, ,I 15, 986 P .2d 115.

Mother's single parent status. The juvenile court announced that the state had a
policy that a child should have two parents, suggesting that an unfit parent was better
than no parent. Tr. 4 77 :20-25. At least in the adoption context, the Legislature has
deemed otherwise, providing for adoption by "any single adult" and noting that a court
could place a child "with a single adult," so long as the adult was not in a prohibited
marriage. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-102( 4), -117( 4 ).

Our appellate courts likewise support court awards of custody to a single parent in
child welfare cases rejecting arguments that termination is precluded where one parent
brings a petition against the other, where a single adult brings a petition, where a child is
not lega11y available for adoption, where the anticipated adoptive parent is single, where
an adoptive home has not yet been identified, or where an adoptive placement has fallen
through. See e.g., In re A.M, 2009 UT App 119, 208 P.3d 1058 (affirming termination
order where Mother brought petition, holding that best-interest did not require an
evaluation of the petitioning parent's fitness.); In re S. Y. T, 2011 UT App 407, 267 P.3d
930 (affirming termination petition brought by children's older, half-sister); In re W.M.,
2007 UT App 15, 2007 WL 127938 (rejecting Mother's argument that her rights should
not have been terminated when Father's rights to youngest remained intact, which
prevented that child from being adopted); In re B.O., 2011 UT App 215,

~

14,262 P.3d

46 (affirming termination of parental rights where child was placed with single-parent
9

relative); In re C.A., 2006 UT App 159, if 3, 2006 WL 1030364 (affirming termination
order where adoptive home had not been located); In re J W, 2006 UT App 52, 2006 WL
3 50216 (affirming termination where foster parents determined they could not adopt
child). See also In re JD., 2011 UT App 184 if 23,257 P.3d 1062 (child's adoption status
is only one factor to consider in best-interest analysis); Id. at ,I 36 (Orme, J., concurring)
(only in the rarest case would it serve a child's interests to maintain an unfit parent's legal
claim). 12

State financial subsidies. The juvenile court erred as a matter of law relying on
the fact that Mother had once received public assistance in its best-interest analysis. See
tr. 469:3-13 ("I did find it interesting ... that there was still a period of time, albeit brief,

that she applied for State assistance. You know, that's one thing that public policy
requires us to look at here."). The juvenile court's position seems untenable given that
virtually every foster parent receives a state subsidy and given that the Legislature
requires the Division to inform all potential adoptive parents about available subsidies.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-4a-607; -904. In the present case, Father had proven himself

12

The few cases where the court of appeals endorsed arguments going to single-parent
status or adoptive-status resulted in reversal on certiorari. In re Adoption ofR.B.F.S.,
2011 UT 46, 258 P.3d 583 (reversing Utah Court of Appeals holding that termination of
Father's rights was inappropriate where Stepfather not yet eligible to adopt); In re CL.,
2007 UT 51, 166 P .3d 608 (reversing court of appeals determination that single foster
mother's post-termination decision to back out of adoption was grounds to set aside
termination order.). In short, a judge's reluctance to grant a termination petition brought
by a single parent is not borne out by law but nevertheless happens. See e.g., Thiele v.
Judge Anderson, 1999 UT App 56, 975 P.2d 481 (granting petition for extraordinary
relief against judge who was reluctant to grant single mother's adoption petition).
IO

unlikely to provide support whether or not his parental rights were intact.

Child was happy and loving and was not suffering "enough." The court ruled
against best-interest in part because no evidence supported that Child was suffering any
psychological damage from Father's unfitness. "I don't find any compelling reason to
terminate his rights if child is not suffering that detriment."
A best-interest determination does not require a showing of damage or detriment.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-509, -510. In fact, this Court has endorsed best-interest

determinations where the juvenile court had found that the child was thriving and happy.
See, e.g., In re TH., 2009 UT App 340, 15, 2009 WL 3863681 (child had thrived in

foster home); In re C.B., 2009 UT App 290,

~

7, 2009 WL 3215067 (children had bonded

with foster family); In re JD., 2011 UT App 184 at ii 21 (best interest supported
termination where children presented as mentally, physically and emotional well in their
present situation); In WM W, 2004 UT App 233,

,r,i 1-2, 2004 WL 1534789 at* 1 (court

appropriately terminated parental rights even absent evidence of harm or injury to child);
In re MC., 940 P.2d 1229, 1237, 1997 WL 348872 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (court erred in
VJJJ

denying termination based "on its largely unexplained feelings ... that the abuse in this
case was not sufficient to justify termination); In re N.K. C., 1999 UT App 345, il 8, 995
P.2d 1 (affirming medical neglect despite fact that Mother's inaction did not result in
harm to child); In re Z.B., 2004 UT App 477, 2004 WL 2903984, at* 1 (rejecting
Mother's argument that termination not warranted where her behavior demonstrated no
severe abuse or neglect).
1I

Paternal Grandparent visitation. The juvenile court impermissibly factored
grandparent and extended family visitation into its best-interest analysis, even though
Mother maintained the constitutional prerogative to determine third-party visitation. See
Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84,

~

22, 986 P .2d 115 (mother has fundamental right to regulate

child's visitation). "I do believe this child could benefit from a positive loving nurturing
relationship with his second family." Tr. 478:3-5. Again, Mother's fitness was not at
issue. In re A.M, 2009 UT App 118 at ,r 23 ("The best interests prong of the termination
statute does not anticipate an evaluation of a parent whose fitness has not been challenged
by a cross-petition to terminate parental rights."); In re MJ, 2013 UT App 122, 'TI 25,302
P.3d 485 (foster family's fitness "is not at issue here.").

Fact that other courts did not suspend Father's visitation. The juvenile court
erroneously relied on the fact that the district had not suspended Father's visitation. "If
the divorce court feels it is in child's best interest, why would I do otherwise?" 13 Tr.
4 79: I 1-13. First, Mother never sought an order to suspend visitation in the district court.
Second, district court custody actions presume parental fitness, whereas a juvenile court
best-interest analysis is made after that presumption has been rebutted.
The case of In re S. YT may be helpful. In that case, the juvenile court had earlier
denied a protective order only to later grant a termination petition based on the same set

13

After the October 2011 armed-kidnapping, Father's visits were subject to both
professional supervision and to a security detail. See Minutes, 094902929
Divorce/Annulment, Dec. 22, 2011.
12

of facts. 2011 UT App 407. In In re S. YT., an older sister sought a child protective order
on behalf of her younger half-sister against their sexually abusive father, in part because
the child was approaching the age when Older Sister herself had been victimized. Id.,
2011 UT App 407 at if 4. The juvenile court denied the protective order based on lack of
exigency, but later found grounds and best interests to terminate. Id. Father appealed the
order based in part on this perceived anomaly. This Court affirmed the juvenile courf s
actions, noting that the elements of a protective order differed from those of a termination
action. Id. at ,I 40.
Even though the juvenile court relied on impermissible factors to deny bestinterests, its findings as whole support best interest. This Court should remand the matter
with instructions to the juvenile court to determine best interests and to grant the
termination order.

3. THE JUVENILE COURT FAILED TO RELY ON MANDATORY
STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS TO DETERMINE BEST INTEREST.
Despite having made findings going to the mandatory statutory considerations, the
~

juvenile court failed to rely on those findings in its best-interest analysis. This issue goes
to statutory interpretation, which this Court rcvievvs for correctness. In re H.J., I 999 UT
App 238, ,r 15, 986 P.2d 115. This Court announced its intent to more closely scrutinize
those rare cases where the juvenile court found grounds but not best interests. In re MC.,
940 P.2d 1229, 1236-37, 1997 WL 348872 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court instructed

13

trial courts to go to "extra lengths" to prepare findings for appellate review in those rare
cases.Id.

Statutory best-interest factors. While evidence going to grounds may also
support best-interest, the evidence is viewed through a different lens to consider "the
impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory
grounds for termination have been met." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184 at ii 12. Thus, a
best-interest analysis requires a court to view evidence in terms of the ··paramount
importance" of the child's best interests. Id. at~ 26. This Court has acknowledged that,
having found grounds, a court will often find no "wiggle room" in its best-interest
analysis. In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, iJ 59, 995 P.2d 17 (Wilkins, P.J., concurring); In
re J.D., 2011 UT App 184 at ,r 27. The present case has little, if any, wiggle room.

"[I]n recognition of the importance of this [best-interestl inquiry, the legislature
has thoughtfully identified factors that the juvenile court must consider in performing the
best interest analysis. Id. at ii 27 Those thoughtfully-considered factors, found in section
78A-6-509, require a court to consider the Child's physical, mental or emotional needs
and conditions; 14 the parent's efforts to adjust the circumstances leading to the Child not

The juvenile court found that the Child, who was born in March 2008, last saw Father
in February 2012, when he was nearly four years old. Tr.Ord. ,r 22. The Child is now
seven years old. The Child is "a loving and happy child" who loves trains. Tr. 466:21:
471:17-18. The child is "happy, loving and fun." Id. 478:24-25.
14

14

living with him; 15 the parent's financial support; 16 maintenance of parent-time and
maintenance of custodial communication. 17

Section 78A-6-5 l 0, while restricted to state-initiated proceedings, nevertheless
lists relevant factors. Those factors include whether the child has been integrated into his
present home; whether the child's current family is able and willing to permanently treat
the child as a member of the family; the love, affection and other emotional ties between
the child and his present family; the current family's capacity and disposition to provide
the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education of the child; and the
length of time the child has lived with his present family; and the permanence and
stability of that family. 18 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-5 l 0.

The juvenile court found that Father demonstrated no accountability or remorse. Ord. 1
25. Father has failed to rectify his substance abuse problems and has thrice been kicked
out of prison substance abuse programs. Id. 126. Father will not be able to provide the child
a normal home for at least a year. Id. 1 32b. Father's lack of involvement with the Child is "a
direct result" of his actions and no one else. Tr. 476:23-24. Father does not accept accountability
for his actions. id. 462: 11-13.
15

The juvenile court found that Father had made only nominal financial contributions to
the Child's support and has paid no child supp011 since October 2010 such that he owes
over $20,000. Ord. 1 7. Father will not likely ever provide for Child. Tr. 464:3-10.
16

17

The juvenile court found that Father has had no contact with the Child since February
2012, which was a "direct result" of his own actions. Ord. ifif 22, 32a; Tr. 476:23-24.
The juvenile court found that Child had lived with Mother and Maternal Grandparents
since June 2009. Ord. ilil 6, 27. The court found that Maternal Grandparents provided
emotional support to the Child, and that Child is "pretty lucky to have grandparents like
that." Tr. 466: 14-16. Maternal Grandparents see the Child as a '"loving and happy child."
Id. 466:20-21; 4 71: 14-18; 4 78: 23-25. Maternal Grandfather has stepped into the role of
father figure in every way. Id. 477:23-25; 478: 1-2. Maternal Grandparents intend to
18

15

The juvenile court's written and oral findings reflect that Mother produced
evidence going to the statutory best-interest factors, but that the juvenile comi did not
rely on those findings into its best-interest analysis. Because the finding have already
been made, there is no reason to remand the matter for further procedures other than to
instruct the trial court to enter a best-interest determination and to grant the termination
petition.
Practical effect of termination. Defense counsel often refer to an order
terminating parental rights as analogous to the death penalty. The analogy is misleading
and harms children. A termination order does not and cannot affect the biological or
emotional relationship of a parent and child. A termination order is not a no-contact
order. A termination order means that visitation, if any, becomes best-interest-driven
rather than rights-driven and that the visitation decision is left in the hands of the child's
eventual legal parent. The only thing a termination order can do is to end an unfit parent's
legal claims to a child.
Defense counsel are quick to point out that a termination order ends a parent's
duty to pay child support and ends a child's right to intestate inheritance. Defense counsel
fail to acknowledge that a termination order does not stop a parent from making financial
contributions or from preparing an appropriate will. Practically speaking, most children

continue providing a home for Child. Ord. iJ 27. Child would have suffered greatly had
Father in fact killed or harmed Maternal Grandparents during the October 2011
kidnapping. Tr. 476:13-15.
16

who are the subject of termination petitions will not receive child support from an unfit
parent, whether or not that parent's rights are tenninated.

On the other hand, those unfit parents who maintain residual rights may continue
to involve the child and his or her new family in interminable legal processes, which
(whether the child is aware of the processes or not), by their nature, bring emotional and
financial stress to the household. In the present case, Father has already shown himself to
be an enthusiastic pro se litigant with the time, capacity and access to a legal library to
pursue such incessant litigation. Those unfit parents who maintain residual rights may
stymie a child's health, development and chances for happiness by vetoing an adoption,
vetoing a child's chosen religious affiliation, vetoing an enlistment decision and vetoing
major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment. Utah Code Ann. § 7 8A-6-l05(35)
(defining residual parental rights).

Another legal implication arises in the event of the fit parent's death or disability.
In such an event, any district court custody order would cease to operate and custody
would automatically vest in the surviving parent. Nielson v. Nielson, 826 P.2d I 065,
1066, 1991 WL 330202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ). The surviving (unfit) parent would then
have the "rights and obligations of the surviving divorced parent ... unaffected by the
custody decree entered in the divorce proceeding." Id. at 1066-67. Maternal
Grandparents, who have been Child's day-to-day care givers, would then be required to
undergo yet another legal procedure to obtain visitation, much less custody at a time

17

when the family is already in crisis. Id. See also Jensen v. Bowcutt, 892 P.2d 1053, I 055
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Given the juvenile court findings going to grounds, (in this case Father's
significant criminal history, lack of remorse, lack of accountability, refusal to comply
with court orders, antisocial behavior, substance abuse, mental illness, abandonment,
neglect, history of violent behavior as well as the best-interest findings detailed above)
there is no best-interest reason for Father to maintain any legal claim to Child.

CONCLUSION
This Court should remand the case to the juvenile court with instructions to enter a
best-interest determination and to grant the termination petition. 19
DATED this 7 th day of October 2015.

Martha Pierce, Appellate Attorney
Office of Guardian ad Litem

19

To the extent the trial-level Guardian ad Litem contributed to the juvenile court's
misapprehension of the law, it was not so much invited error, but ineffective assistance of
a Guardian ad Litem, which the Director has since remedied. For this reason, this Court
should consider these claims on appeal as it did when it summarily reversed In re L. C.,
20150019-CA based on the Attorney General's concession of error, which contradicted
the position of the trial-level Attorney General.
18
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT -

BRIGHAM CITY

IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ST A TE OF UTAH in the Interest of:
G.J.C.

03-16-2008

Case No. 1083532

A person under 18 years of age.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Volume I

January 28, 2015

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANGELA F. FONNESBECK
Juvenile Court Judge

So let me just take a minute and tell you folks
2

what I reviewed so you know exactly what I had an

3

opportunity to look at during the break,

I've got the two binders from petitioner's

4

~

all right?

I have

5

counsel.

6

treated them as being numbered consistent with the tabs,

7

provided by petitioner's counsel.

8
9

While we didn't independently number them,

Now,

in terms of those documents,

only -- let's just find it here now.

as

there was

There was only one

10

document that I did not specifically take a look at that l

11

did not -- that was not addressed or specifically referenced

12

in any testimony,

13

just got to get to it.

14

and let me tell you what that is.

In volume -- or in Binder 1, under Tab 1,

I've

the very

15

first document in that section starting with zero -- or

16

ending with 01 is a presentence report.

17

that specific report,

18 ,

there were some documents related to Mr. Carter's addendum,

19

which I did review,

20

related to Mr. Cronin's substance abuse program while

21

incarcerated that I also reviewed.

22

I did not review

although later in that same section,

and there was the discharge summary

I did not review in detail the other Department of

23

Corrections attached to that discharge summary,

24

addressed them particularly either.

25

I did review in detail the other documents provided,

Although,

as we never
like I said,
the --
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the presentence addendum and report that Mr. Carter actually
2

spoke about, as well as the Board of Pardons worksheets,

3

progress report and re-hearing report,

4

applications in those.

5

reviewed the other documents in each of these binders, okay?
Now,

6

the

the board of hearings

With the exception of that,

in terms of dad's exhibits, again,

I

we didn'L

7

label them specifically while we were in court because we

8

weren't sure which ones we were going to be taking a look at

9

for sure.

10

So let me tell you how I labeled them so

everybody knows.

11

I labeled as dad's Exhibit A the registered

12

principal search provided from the Utah Department of

13

Commerce website.

14

letter from Jacqueline Campbell as -- and then No. 3 was the

15

email from a Neil Cooper.

16

are duplicates in the other exhibits, but I did not find the

17

page numbers of those.

18

I labeled as Defendant's Exhibit B the

Both of these items,

I believe,

I labeled as Defendant's Exhibit D the

19'

psychological evaluation by Dr. Fox that Mr. Cronin

20

referenced.

21

not review that as some type of expert document in any way,

22

shape or form,

23

Mr. Cronin's testimony.

24

weight as some type of evidentiary,

25

testimony or -- or finding or anything of the sort.

I want to make perfectly clear again that I did

I simply looked at it in the context of
But, again,

I gave it no particular
you know,

expert
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I labeled as Defendant's Exhibit Ea series of
2

emails between Mr. Cronin and Mr. Baxter, and these were ch~

3

emails that were provided, I believe, on day one of this

4

trial when Mr. Baxter was testifying and these were provided

5

to the Court and to counsel during Mr. Cronin's cross-

6

examination of Mr. Baxter.
And then I labeled as Defendant's Fa series of

7

8

emails -- I'm sorry.

Well, they say email, but I actually

9

think they were text messages.

A

racebook printout and some

10

transcripts from protective order hearings,

11

Davis County Justice Court docket that Mr. Cronin addressed

12

with the petitioner mom during her cross-examination by him.
So those are the documents that we have in the

13
14

record that I have reviewed.
Now,

15
16
17

as well as the

let me get my other stack of documents over

here.
So I think everybody in this room recognizes the

18

difficulty of these situations and the difficult decision

19

that this Court is asked to make regarding at least what I

20

think is a pretty complicated legal issue, not to mention

21'

we're dealing with some -- some very serious,

you know,

22

quasi-constitutional rights of parents here.

This was not

23

an easy choice,

24

spent a bulk of the last several days reading the Code,

25

reading the law,

this was not an easy decision, and I have

reading any cases I could find to be
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adequately prepared for what I thought might come up in
2

these proceedings.

3

And I want to thank both parties, you know,

for

4

your demeanor during court.

I know these are difficult

5

issues.

6

issues,

7

behaved yourself appropriately in court, and I appreciate

8

that.

I know we're dealing with some very contentious
full of a lot of emotional and -- and you both

Mr. Cronin, you did a fine job representing

9

10

yourself.

I know it was difficult and you felt like the

11

Court oftentimes threw up roadblocks.

12

both had fine representation in this courtroom during these

13

proceedings, and I know that's part of what makes my role so

14

difficult here.

But I -- I think you

Mr. Mortensen, thank you again for providing a

15
16

trial brief to the Court that is quite helpful to me, and

17

for having your exhibits in such a helpful order.

18

a lot of the work out of what we would have to otherwise do

19

in these proceedings, so I appreciate that very much.

20

you.

21

It takes

Thank

So let me start by telling you the facts that I

22

found most relevant.

23

other facts presented, but these are the facts that I found

24

most relevant to the situation before us.

25

It doesn't mean that there weren't

That during this marriage and up through late
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summer/early fall of October 2010,

I think that Dad did his

2

best to have consistent and regular contact with "G."

And I

3

think he did have a fairly close father-son relationship

4

during that period of time, which was supported by his

5

extended family; primarily, it appears, his mother and at

6

least one sister.
I also believe that during that period of time,

7

8

Mr. -- Mr. Cronin, or Dad, contributed in some way to the

9

emotional health and support of "G," and perhaps only

10

nominally, you know,

to his financial support.

I realize that there -- during the course of the

11

12

marriage when the parties resided together,

13

family support and the like.

14 ,

for a parent time supervisor, which at least speaks for

15

something.

16

there was some

I realize Mr. Cronin did pay

On the child support area, obviously,

the

17

financial support was extraordinarily lacking.

18

though there's a disagreement on what amounts were paid,

19

they were nominal at best, compared to what the court order

20

required of him.

21

And even

I also find that the child involvement with law

22

enforcement up to and including that summer and early fall

23

is extraordinarily troublesome,

24

don't place the fault for that squarely on Dad's shoulders

25

or solely on his shoulders.

it is disturbing to me.

I

I believe that Dad took
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liberties with parent time.

I believe that he withheld the

2

child at the conclusions of visits,

3

orders required of him.

4

enforcement involvement at that point in time, was a direct

5

result of a pretty nasty,

6

parents.

7

for pick-ups and exchanges and whatever cests squarcJy,

8

know,

But I do believe that a lot of law

ugly custody battle between two

And I think the fault for that police involvemenc

you

on both parents' shoulders.
Now,

9

contrary to what court

that's not to say that -- that I don't place

10

fairly -- or squarely on Mr. Cronin's shoulders the police

11

involvement during the October incident, because that was in

12

fact a direct result of his actions.
You know,

13

I -- I was -- as a practitioner,

I spend

14

an awful lot of time in front of Comm. Garner.

15

something to the effect of "a protective order is being put

16

1

When he says

in place to protect the parents from each other because they

17,

can't communicate, because they can't do what's in their

18

child's best interest," I believe that to be true.

19 !

really do believe, up to that point in time,

20

vitriol and hatred between these two parties was as a result

21

22
23

1

And I

a lot of the

of that divorce proceeding and not because either of them
weren't capable of being parents.
I'm -- I am concerned by Dad's custodial

24

interference charges and his recent criminal history.

25

less compelled,

I guess,

I was

to -- to worry about his driving
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1

record and charges,

2

by the recent DUI allegations levied against Mom.

3

the child was not in the car during that period of time --

4

that was Mom's testimony -- so I didn't find that

5

particularly moving.

I know

I also didn't hear any evidence to suggest that

6

7

during the period of time of Dad's, perhaps, poor choice in

8

driving skills, or technique,

9

was -- was present during any of those either,

so I did not

In terms of the testimony of the parties, let

11

me -- or not of the parties,

12
13

I didn't hear that the child

give particular weight to that.

10

1

I'm sorry, of the witnesses, I

was pretty moved by Mr. Baxter's testimony in the context of

14

the seriousness of those texts from Mr. Cronin.

15

disturbing text messages.

16

should ever have to receive a Lext message like that

17

threatening himself or his family.

18

absolutely deplorable.

Those are

No attorney doing their job

And in the same vein,

19
vi)

just as I was not particularly compelled

That type of behavior is

I find it equally deplorable

20

that that kind of threat would be made via text message to

21

Mom.

22

where text messages show that that did in fact happen, with

23

threats being made to Mom and to her parents.

24

particularly troublesome because, even in a -- in a nasty

25

divorce situation, that might be taking things one step too

And I think there's at least a couple of occasions

I find that
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far.
In regard to Mr. Carter 1 s testimony,

2

I found his

I was -- it was

3

testimony to be very capable and honest.

4

refreshing for me to see him acknowledge that he had only

5

nominal training in mental health issues, even though he was

6'

making some assessments about someone's mental health.

7

I do believe he has substantial training and a broad skill

8

set when evaluating defendants for the court.

9

of that,

But

And because

I did give his -- his testimony considerable

weight.

10

I thought it was extremely compelling that he --

11

12

he stated that he, meaning Mr. Cronin, does not appear to

13

seriously take into account the consequences of his actions

14

and that he's minimizing the long-term effects his actions

15 i

may have had on the victims.

16

indicative of a situation that -- that Mr. Cronin found

17

himself in.
Now,

18

I think those are really

I don't know whether that's a product of a

19

mental illness.

20

those are -- actually,

21

someone who sees a lot of defendants in the system.

those are disturbing statements from

As a result of Mr. Carter's testimony,

22

23

I don't know what that's a product of, but

1

I am also

concerned about Dad's drug dependency issues, his lack of

24

ownership of those drug dependency issues,

25

admissions,

you know,

and even by his

his failure to rectify any of those.
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We did not spend a lot of time discussing the depth or
2

length of those drug dependency issues, but they're clearly

3

there and they are problematic, especially if they continue

4

to go untreated.
In terms of Mr. Cronin's testimony,

5

there is no

6

doubt in my mind that he's really sorry to find himself in

7

this situation.

And I'm sure he wishes that things were --

8

were different.

And I think,

9

Now,

in his own way, he loves "G."

I don't know that's the way that all parents would love

10

a child, but I think,

11

all true.

from his perspective,

those things are

I am not, however, convinced that he is

12
13

particularly remorseful for his actions against Mr. and

1~

Mrs. Bess.

15

related to issues for which he's currently incarcerated, he

16

invoked his right to not comment on those, which I did not

17

hold against him in any way,

18

courtroom, perhaps, was the first time anyone heard the

19

words "remorse" or "forgiveness" or "I'm sorry" come out of

20

his mouth.

21

genuine feelings on his part.

Now, while I understand that Dad cannot comment

Because of that,

shape or form,

I think this

I'm not convinced those are

I also don't know that I believe that he's

22
23

particularly remorseful for making that threat against

24

Ms. Bess.

25

other.

I think these two parties clearly don't like each

I think it's pretty obvious,

you know, that that's
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1

the case, and "hate" might even be the right word.

2

don't feel a lot of empathy or remorse between them.

But I

I do think Mr. Cronin has made only minimal

3
4

efforts to provide support for this child, despite his

5

statements in court and his presumed ability to earn an

6

income.

7

support for this child.

8

and an obligation that he's not obligated to follow through

9

with unless he's getting what he wants on a parent time

10

I'm just not convinced that he ever will provide
I do think he sees it as a burden

schedule, and that's just not what the law says.

11

So, you know, again,

I think he's made nominal

12

efforts, at best, on that financial end.

13

I'm also troubled that there are no verifiable

14

attempts by Mr. Cronin to improve his current situation.

15

have to conclude, therefore, that there haven't been such

16

attempts.

17

by his own testimony, that, three times, he's been booted

18

out of rehab programs in the prison.

19

I

And I think that's supported by the fact, again

While I heard him testify that he was trying to

20

"find himself" and he was exploring some other things, you

21

know, there is just no verifiable attempts on his -- on his

22

part to get treatment or therapy or anything of the sort.

23

I'm inclined to believe that Mr. Cronin does

24

suffer from some type of mental health event.

He himself

25

has indicated that he suffers from depression and was, at
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one point in time,

I don't know if he continues

2

to suffer from those things.

3

that end.

We did hear that he didn't receive much

4

treatment,

although he did testify to some treatment prior

5

to his incarceration.

We didn't hear testimony as to

But I think there is a severe lack of follow-

6

vi)

suicidal.

7

through there to get himself in a situalion where his monla~

8

health is such as to be stable and healthy and happy and

9

productive.
Based on the testimony before the Court today,

10
11

appears that Mr. Cronin last saw "G" around February of

12

2012.

13

Easter.

14,

would have been the last time that Mr. Cronin,

15 ,

any member of his family,

it

There was some indication it may have been closer to
But at least in that early February 2012 time frame

Now,

16

or it appears

saw "G."

as to the testimony of both Mr. and

17

Mrs. Bess.

This was extremely moving Lo the Court.

I think

18

it took a lot of guts on their part to sit in this courtroom

19

to again tell the story of the incidences that happened in

20

October of 2010.

21

because I know it was difficult.

22

emotional turmoil that they must have experienced because of

23

Mr. Cronin's actions, because of his behavior, wow,

24

deplorable.

25

experience that type of event.

I can't thank them enough for doing that

It's horrible.

And the amount of

that is

No one should ever have to
And I can absolutely
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I__

understand, without question, why the Besses want no contact
2

with Mr. Cronin.

I think we can all just be grateful

3

that -- that "G" was not present or in the car during thaL

4

series of events.

5

place people, regardless of whether a gun was involved or

6

not.

7

of other courts have issued factual findings and -- and

8

Mr. Cronin's incarcerated for a specific reason; that is a

9

heinous event directed towards Mr. anci Mrs.

10

Just one more thing on that note.

That is a terrible situation in which to

And I'm not going to make that finding.

I think lots

Ress.
I think

11

everybody owes a great deal of gratitude to Mr. and

12

Mrs. Bess for,

13

provide some degree of reason in terms of parent time

1~

exchanges and -- and providing that financial and emotional

15

support to "G."

16

grandparents like that.

you know, trying to

I think he's pretty lucky to have

I was -- I was excited to hear each of them talk

17
18

throughout this process,

1

about this little boy because we got very little evidence

19

about what this little boy was like and we're here

20

discussing what's best for him.

21

the grandparents talk about what a loving and happy child he

22

is, because that's who this is really about.

23

In terms of Mr. Sharp's testimony,

So I was pleased to hear

I do think his

24

testimony was based on -- on substantial expertise in the

25

field of licensed professional counseling.

And I think,
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1

from that end, his testimony is credible.
I did find it concerning that Mr. Sharp indicated

2
3

that, when using that DSM as a diagnostic tool, that

4

interviewing or interacting with the subject was not

5

necessary.

6

that who knows who's out there diagnosing each of us, you

7

know, this exact moment?

8

we're all a little crazy for being here in the first place.

9

I think that's a little bit scary as a person

I'm sure everyone might say that

That was bothersome to me,

I have to say.

And I

10

was glad to hear Mr. Sharp later qualify that -- that using

11

that as a diagnostic tool is in fact better if that type of

12

interaction would have occurred.

13

Mr. Sharp also testified to treating Mom

14

personally and interacting with the child on just limited

15

circumstances through that treatment.

16

addition to reviewing the information from his patient, he

17

reviewed Dr. Fox's psychological evaluation, AP&P

18

assessments, court-ordered protective orders, other AP&P

19

records, and Mr. Cronin's criminal records.

20

He indicated that, in

While not all of that information is biased, I do

21

think a lot of the information reviewed by Mr. Sharp comes

22

from a biased perspective against Dad.

23

know the way of knowing, nor do I feel like I was

24

appropriately educated to know whether or not the

25

information Mr. Sharp received in those assessments was

And I -- I don't
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1

complete.
I also don't know whether the evidence he reviewed

2
3

was somehow cherry-picked or shortened or lengthened or -

4

have no idea.

5

come from a biased perspective, and I would feel so much

6

better if his - his testimony had been based on some type of

7

interaction with Mr. Cronin.

9

But I do think a lot of that information did

So while I -

8

I believe that Mr. Sharp's testimony

is credible and reliable,

I did not give iL che Lype or

10

weight or that hefty weight that I think petitioner would

11

have liked me to have done so.
Much like the guardian,

12

I

I was surprised by the

13

absence of testimony from this particular individual as to

14

what psychological damage or effects that this child may be

15 :

experiencing or suffering from.

16

about that, and that's somewhat surprising lo this Courl.

17

It creates a hole,
Now,

18

I think,

We didn't hear anything

in what I can consider.

in terms of Mom,

I think she has a subjective

19

fear,

20

she has a severe dislike and mistrust of him, and I think

21

that is all supported by their history.

22

anyone is surprised to

23

her son,

24
25

a very real subjective fear of Mr. Cronin.

to see that.

I think

I don't think
I believe she loves

I believe she truly wants what's best for him.
I'm concerned, as she was,

that "G" was and may

still be being used as a pawn when we're talking about

4 68

custody of this child.
2

He may not know it, but I think all

the adults in the room can see that for what it is.
I believe that Mom has produced, you know, a

3
4

resume that gives her the financial ability to support this

5

child.

6

interesting, although I didn't give it great weight,

7

despite this -

8

her family's willingness to provide that financial support

9

that there was still a period of time, albeit brief,

I think she has supported this child.

I did find it
that

this ability to support herself and despite

10

she applied for State assistance.

You know,

11

thing that public policy requires us to look at here.

12

mean,

13

period of time,

14

fact.

that

that's one
So,

I

I was pleased to see that it was for a very short
you know, but I did take a look at that

I did take particular note, as I think the

15
16

guardian ad litem did,

that the cards and/or letters,

17

whether it's two or twenty,

18

the child, after she consulted with her therapist, decided

19

that it was not appropriate to give them to the child or for

20

her to look at them because of the damage to her.

that are sent by Mr. Cronin to

I didn't hear why anyone thought it would be

21

22

damaging to him to review or receive these letters.

23

we can all guess, but I didn't hear any evidence to that

24

end.

25

I think

I wish I would have.
I also took note and found it interesting that,
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despite these multiple police interventions,

that Mom never

2

called DCFS for an investigation of abuse or neglect and

3

that no law enforcement agency was ever called to perform a

4

welfare check during parent time.

5

enforcement was pretty primarily used only to keep the peace

6

during exchanges.

It appears that law

7

So as to Genevieve Cronin's testimony, much like

8

the other grandparents in this case, I found her testimony

9

particularly moving.

I think there is no doubt in the world

10

that we have grandparents on both sides of this family that

11

deeply love this child.

12

wonderful grandparent-grandchild relationship with "G" and

13

that him being removed from her life was particularly

14

devastating to her.

15

1

to "G" as well,

I think that Mrs. Cronin did have a

I have to think that it was devastating

if he did have that type of relationship,

which it appears that he did.

16

I do not believe, based on the testimony I've

17

18

heard over the last three days,

19

actions were in any way -

20
1

an accomplice to or -

that Genevieve Cronin's

I don't believe she was in any way

or involved in Mr. Cronin's actions,

21

whether they be the October 2010 incident or the refusal to

22

return "G" at the end of parent time.

23

believe Mr. Cronin 1 s extended family knowingly participated

24

in any type of event.

25

I simply do not

So a couple of other things I think everyone
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should know that I looked at here.
Clearly, both parents' testimony are extremely

2

3

self-serving.

I get that.

I understand that.

4

expect it to be.

5

enough to know that's how we present our clients.

6

recognize that fact.

7

you for doing that.

8

them for what they were.

I sat at these tables as an attorney long
So I

I didn't hold it against either one of
But I just want you to know I did take

I've mentioned already that I -

9

I would

I feel like we

10

were missing something throughout the course of these three

11

days, and that's this little boy.

12

talk about him and his best interest, and yet I sit up here

13

knowing practically nothing about him.

14

I mean, we're here to

I know he's six, or around six.

I

15

is "G."

16

I heard about him, basically, was from a grandparent that

17

says he's happy,

18

fun.

19

I know he lives with his mom.

I know his name

he's loving,

But everything else

he loves trains, he's a lot of

That's what I know about this child, and that is it.
That is surprising to me as a finder of fact in a

20

case trying to make a decision about what is best for him.

21

I know nothing about him.

22

Throughout these proceedings -

and I think

23

Mr. Cronin made this pretty clear -

I didn't hear any

24

evidence of actual physical abuse against this child,

25

didn't hear any evidence to suggest the child is suffering

I
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from some type of psychological detriment post-October or
2

2010.

And even if I had,

I'm not sure I would be able to

3

find that it was a direct result of the October incident,

4

given that he wasn't there, as opposed to being a direct

5

result of this vitriolic relationship between the parents

6

and their custody dispute.
I didn't hear any evidence that the child

7
8

witnessed any violence.

9

hear that the child was even aware of the Octobe~ 2010

10

incident.

11

about it,

12

fact.

I know he wasn't there,
somebody told it -

which means,

if he knows

told him about it after the

But I don't know if he even knows.
I also don't know if this child is even aware of

13
14

I don't have any evidence to - to

!

Dad's current incarceration.

He's obviously aware that

15

Dad's not visiting him.

16

thing he doesn't know those things,

17

I'm not sure what sort of psychological damage or impact

18 ,

he's even suffering at this stage.

19

And I'm not saying that's a bad
but I'm just -

again,

I would mention that it was extremely helpful to

20,

me to be able to review the protective orders and the

21

divorce orders,

22

between Mom and Dad.

23

that the standard of proof in the divorce court is lower

24

than the standard of proof here.

25

is clear and convincing, which means I have to be pretty

to help establish this factual history
I

just would remind everyone,

though,

The standard of proof here
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dang certain that the facts support what's -

you know, the

relief being sought.

2

I did find it compelling that, even after the

3
4

allegations related to the October 2010 incident were

5

brought before the Court,

6

stop parent time or stop contact altogether.
Now,

7

that the divorce court did not

I realize that supervised parent time was put

8

in place, but again,

I have to agree with the guardian here

9

that it does not appear that that was put in place because

10

of any direct abuse or damage to the child.

11

found those things interesting.
Now,

12

So, again,

I

let me kind of go through a few other things

13

in the law that I think are important for us to keep in mind

14

here.

15

of the Code that I think are so important.

And I'm going to actually read a couple of sections

It is petitioner's burden in a case like this to

16

17

prove by clear and convincing evidence that one of the

18

statutory grounds for termination have been met.

19

also petitioner's burden to show that it is in the best

20
21

1

'

interest of this child that parental rights be terminated.
That means that,

you know, even if I find that one of these

22

statutory grounds have been met,

23

another finding.

24
25

But it's

I

still have to make

And I did want to read to you from 78A-6-503(12).
And this section of the Code talks specifically about the
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State's public policy, sort of preferences, in these types
2

of cases.

3

unfit or incompetent based on one of those grounds for

4

termination, it still says that the court shall then

5

consider the welfare and best interest of the child of

6

paramount importance in determining whether to terminate

7

determining whether termination of the parental rights

8

should be ordered.

if a parent is found to be

This is a separate prong that we have to decide

9
10

And it just says that,

here, and the burden has to be met as to that prong as well.
And in that same section,

11

in subpart

(4),

it says,

12

you know,

13

concerning the care,

14

child is recognized protected and does not cease to exist

15

simply because a parent fails to be a model parent.

16

the fundamental liberty interest of a parent
custody and management of the parent's

A little further down in Section 7 it says that

17

the court may not presume that a child and the child's

18

parents are adversaries.

19

You know, we're looking at some pretty serious

20

issues here.

21

constitutional rights under the law.

22

These are what we consider quasi-

The other section of the Code here that I found of

23

particular relevance to this case is found at -

24

section, subpart

25

(10) (d).

same

And it states:

"The interest of the State favors preservation and
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not severance of natural familial bonds in

I.Ji)

2

situations where a positive,

nurturing parent-

3

child relationship can exist,

4

family association and support."

including extended

5

Now, both parents have faults,

6

Dad,

7

model parent.

8

of work to do.

you've got some real issues.

You are not a

You are not a model citizen.

You have a lot

I think both of you have faults as parents, but,

9

10

Dad, clearly,

11

looming in this room.

your faults are pretty large and pretty
You need to be cognizant of that.

So, when I look at this and I look at the

12

standards under the law and the provisions of the law, and I

13

14

no question.

1

look at whether petitioner has met their burden by clear and

15 ,

convincing evidence,

16

as it comes to some statutory provisions.

17

they have met their burden in proving that Dad has abandoned

18

this child and that he has failed to communicate with the

19 i

child by telephone or otherwise for six months.
Now,

20

I do believe they have met their burden
I do believe that

I'm specifically excluding mail here, because

21

I don't know how many times Mr. Cronin has attempted to

22

contact him by mail.

23

roughly,

24

this child.

25

But I do know that it has been,

two years since Mr. Cronin has had any contact with

I do believe that Mr. Cronin has neglected this
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child and that he is incarcerated as a result of a
2

conviction of a felony,

the sentence of such that the length

3

would deprive the child of a normal home for one year.
I also believe that there is evidence of a history

4
5

of violent behavior here.

Maybe not towards the child, but

6

violent behavior nonetheless.
I do believe that petitioner -

7

and I find the

8

petitioner has met their burden when it comes to finding

9

evidence of unfitness.

10'
11

12

13

1

Because I do think the crime that

Mr. Cronin has been convicted of is such a nature as to
prove his unfitness in caring for this chi.ld' s emotional
health and development.
I can't imagine what pain this little boy would be

14

in if you had in fact harmed or killed his grandparents.

15

That is pretty ugly and that would be a pretty ugly world to

16

leave this child in.

17

I also believe that petitioner has met their

18

burden when it comes to the finding of token efforts.

19

say that because I think Mr. Cronin has made less than token

20

efforts when it comes to supporting this child or

21

communicating with this child.

22

letters you have or have not sent, but your lack of

23

involvement in this child's life over the last couple of

24

years is a direct result of your actions and no one else's.

25

Again,

And I

I don't know how many

I also find that you've made only token efforts to
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avoid being an unfit parent.
Now,

2

3

the token efforts to communicate based on a case that

4

Mr. Cronin brought before this Court,

5

grandma's attempt to communicate with a child.

6

going to distinguish this case from that case in this way:

Court,

8
9

talking about
And I'm

In the case that Mr. Cronin brought before the

7

it talked about "grandma attempting to arrange parent

time and visitation on behalf of the parent."

1

That is not

10

the reason grandma was trying to make contact here, because

11

dad was not able to visit with the child.

12

facts before this Court are distinguishable from that.

13

-.J

I want to make one comment specifically as to

Now,

I

So I think the

that gets us to the last prong of what we're

1 '1

here to deal with today, which is the best interest of this

15

child.

16

in "G's" best interest,

17

not what is in Dad's best interest and not what I believe

18

would be in Grandma's or Grandpa's best interest; I have to

19

look at "G" here.

I have to look at what is

not what is in Mom's best interest,

I think everyone should know that the lack of

20
21

And when I look at this,

!

having an individual to step in to replace the role of the

22

parent, while important,

I gave less weight,

23

the guardian ad litem did.

24

policy in the state that a child have two parents.

25

have a grandpa who cannot step into that role legally, he

You know,

I think,

than

it is a matter of
While we
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1

has stepped into that role in every other way.

So I gave

2

that fact very little consideration in my decision.
I do, however, believe that this child could

3
4

benefit from a positive,

5

his extended family.

6

life, and having that second family in his life would be in

7

his best interest.

8

parental rights today,

9

10

i.

loving,

nurturing relationship with

I think he has a second family in his

And if I were to tcr.minate Dad's
I would be going against what I think

is best for this child in that regard.
We have an extended family here who has not proven

1

11

to be any direct detriment to this child.

12

have not proven to even show that they would be.

15

they

Now, will Dad be able to have that positive,

13
14

He has not -

1

i

loving,
know.

nurturing relationship with this child?

I don't

But what the statute says is that that relationship

16 ,

can exist.

And I

think we have to believe that it can.

17

I do know that it can exist with the second -

18

extended family on Mr. Cronin's side.

19

terminating the possibility for that relationship would be

20

contrary to "G's'' best interest.
I also, again, was -

21

But

with his

And I think

was so surprised to find that

22

there was no evidence presented that this child was actually

23

suffering any psychological damage or effect from his

24
25

1

previous relationship with Mr. Cronin.
says is that "he's happy,

All the evidence

loving and fun."

I don't know
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that my terminating Dad's rights would change that;

I

2

certainly hope not.

3

compelling reason to terminate Dad's rights if this child is

4

not suffering that detriment.
And, again,

5

But I don't find that there's any

just to mention that,

you know,

the

6

divorce court has a lower standard than we do in this court.

7

And I found it compelling that the divorce court, even when

8

becoming aware of these incidences in October of 2010, did

9

not feel that it was necessary to prohibit Dad 1 s contact

10

with this child.

11:

If

the divorce court feels that it 1 s in the best

12

interest of this child to have -

13

I -

have this parent, why would

why would I do otherwise?
And because of those reasons,

14

I am not finding

15

today that it is in the child's best interest to terminate

16

Dad's rights.

17

a lot of freakin' work to do.

18

a good parent.

19

Mom is ever going to let you be involved in this child's

20

life.

21

I have before me,

22

termination of parental rights.

23

Now, make no bones about jL,

Dad,

you've got

You are a long way from being

And I can't sit here today and tell you that

But at least sitting here today, with the facts that

Now,

I am going to deny Mom's petition for

I'm going to remind everyone present in the

24

courtroom that you do have a right to appeal this decision

25

if you're aggrieved by the decision I made today.

In a
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1

child's welfare action, you must file that notice of appeal

2

within 15 days of my written decision.
Now, if you are represented by an attorney, which

3
4

you are, ma'am, your attorney is required to prepare that

5

notice of appeal, and you are both required to sign it.

6

be aware of that.

So

Ms. Wight, I'm actually going to ask you to

7
8

prepare the order from today's proceedings, making sure each

9

of the parties has a copy of it.
That will be the order of the Court.

10
11

recess.

12

{Whereupon, at the hour of 2:55 p.rn.,

13

January 30, 2015, the trial in this

14

matter was concluded.)

15

Court's in

-0000000-

16
17

18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DESIREE DAWN BESS, in the interest of
Griffin Joshua Cronin (born March 16, 2008),

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

a minor under 18 years of age.
Petitioner,

Case No. 1083532

vs.

l.

Judge Angela F. Fonnesbeck

JOSHUA LETOICE CRONIN
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court on the 30

th

day of January, 2015 for ruling on

Petitioner's Verified Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. Present were: Desiree Dawn Bess,
the petitioner, and her counsel, Paul W. Mortensen; Joshua Letoice Cronin, the respondent, pro

se; and Camille Wight, Guardian ad Litem.

Whereupon, the Court having listened to the testimony of Brandon Baxter, petitioner's
former attorney; Todd Carter, respondent's former probation officer; Joshua Cronin,
respondent; Noel Bess, petitioner's father, Chuck Sharp, expert witness; Desiree Bess,
petitioner, Mildred Bess, petitioner's mother, and Genevieve Cronin, respondent's mother, and
reviewed Petitioner's Exhibits 1-21 (minus a few documents in Exhibit 1, which were not
addressed or specifically referenced by any testimony) and Respondent's Exhibits A-F, the Court
enters, by clear and convincing evidence, the following Findings of Fact:
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1. Griffin Joshua Cronin is a male child who was born on March 16, 2008.

2. Desiree Dawn Bess is the legal mother of the child. Her current address is 323 East
700 North, Brigham City, Utah 84302. Her date of birth is October 11, 1982.

3. Joshua Letoice Cronin is the legal father of the child. He is currently incarcerated in
the Utah State Prison, 14425 Bitterbrush Lane, Draper, Utah 84020. His date of birth
is July 13, 1981.

4. This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition pursuant to Utah Code §78A-6-103(g).
Venue is proper in Box Elder County pursuant to Utah Code §78A-6-110.

5. Ms. Bess and Mr. Cronin were formerly wife and husband. They were married on
July 6, 2006.

6. Ms. Bess and Mr. Cronin separated in June 2009. Ms. Bess filed for divorce at that
time.

7. Since the parties' separation in June 2009, Mr. Cronin's financial contribution to the
child has been nominal. Mr. Cronin has paid no child support since October 2010.
His current obligation is over $20,000.

8. In September 2009, a temporary order was issued in the divorce action awarding
Ms. Bess sole physical custody of the child and granting Mr. Cronin statutory parent
time.
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9. In November 2009, Ms. Bess filed for a protective order against Mr. Cronin. During a
hearing on the matter, Commissioner Garner found that there had been no physical
violence, but entered the protective order based on the threats Mr. Cronin made to
the mother. There were no restrictions placed on Mr. Cronin's parent time.

10. During the parties' marriage and up through October 2010, Mr. Cronin did his best
to have consistent and regular contact with Griffin. Mr. Cronin had a relationship
with Griffin that was supported by Mr. Cronin's extended family.

l..

Mr. Cronin

contributed to Griffin's emotional and mental support.

11. During the summer of 2010 up through early fall of 2010, the child had involvement
with law enforcement as a result of the troublesome relationship between Ms. Bess
and Mr. Cronin. However, during that time, law enforcement was never contacted
to conduct welfare checks on the child while he was in the care of the father and
D.C.F.S. was never contacted to investigate abuse or neglect of the child.

12. Also, during that time, Mr. Cronin took liberties with his parent time. On at least
two occasions, he kept the child longer than his parent time order allowed. As a
result of his actions, Mr. Cronin received two "criminal interference with custodial
rights" charges and the Court ordered supervised parent time.
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13. On July 9, 2010, Ms. Bess' attorney, Mr. Baxter received a threatening text from Mr.
Cronin stating, "This approach may cost your family and hers more than your willing
to wager its not a smart move to try and corner a resourceful man."'

14. Around this same time, Mr. Cronin also sent threatening texts to Ms. Bess.

15. On October 6, 2010, Mr. Cronin had the child and arranged with Ms. Bess' parents,
Noel and Mildred Bess, to meet him so he could return the child to Ms. Bess' care.
When Mr. and Mrs. Bess arrived at the arranged location, the child was not present.
Mr. Cronin got into the car and forced them to drive to Ms. Bess' location. At some
point during the drive, Mr. Bess stopped the car and Mrs. Bess exited the vehicle.
Mr. Cronin also exited the vehicle and threatened Mrs. Bess. Mrs. Bess fled from the
scene.

Mr. Cronin returned to the car and had Mr. Bess drive him back to his

vehicle.

16. During the events on October 6, 2010, the child was not present. Later that evening,
police were able to locate the child with Mr. Cronin's sister and he was returned to
Ms. Bess. Mr. and Mrs. Bess, Ms. Bess and the child stayed at a hotel that night and
had police search their home before returning to it the next day.

17. Mr. and Mrs. Bess have suffered emotional turmoil as a result of this incident.

18. As a result of this incident, Mr. Cronin received two kidnapping charges.
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19. Ms. Bess has a real, subjective fear of Mr. Cronin and a severe distrust of Mr. Cronin
that is supported by the parties' history as outlined above.

20. Ms. Bess and Mr. Cronin's marriage was terminated by decree of divorce entered
January 7, 2011.

Ms. Bess was awarded sole physical and sole legal custody of

Griffin. After a two-day trial, the Court entered a supplemental final decree on April
27, 2011. Mr. Cronin's contact with Griffin was limited to once-per-week parent-

L

time under the direction and supervision of a certified parent-time supervisor in the
town or city where Griffin resides.

21. Mr. Cronin exercised supervised parent-time under the direction of Jill Scharrenberg
from December 2010 until February or March 2012.

22. Mr. Cronin last saw the child in either February or March of 2012 prior to his most
recent incarceration. Mr. Cronin has sent cards and letters to the child since his
incarceration. These cards and letters have been kept by Ms. Bess, but not given to
the child because of the damage it would cause to Ms. Bess.

23. Genevieve Cronin had a relationship with the child up until the time of Mr. Cronin's
incarceration. Mrs. Cronin has not seen the child since February or March of 2012.
Mrs. Cronin has suffered emotionally as a result of this.

Mrs. Cronin was not

involved or an accomplice to Mr. Cronin's attempts to extend his parent time.

24. Mr. Cronin has a significant criminal history, the most recent convictions include:
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a. May 2011 - he pleaded guilty to violating a protective order and was sentenced
to serve 30 days in jail.

b. November 2011 - he was found guilty of two counts of criminal interference
with custodial rights and was sentenced to serve 180 days in jail.

c.

December 2011 - he pleaded guilty to two counts of Third Degree Felony
Attempted Kidnapping and was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison.

25. On sentencing for the kidnapping charges, AP&P Officer Todd Carter recommended
prison because of Mr. Cronin's lack of accountability, lack of remorse, prior
convictions and substance abuse problems, as well as the impact statements
provided by the victims.

Mr. Carter felt that Mr. Cronin did not appreciate the

consequences of his actions and lacked remorse.

26. On March 28, 2012, Mr. Cronin began his indeterminate sentence of 0-5 years at the
Utah State Prison. Throughout his incarceration, Mr. Cronin has failed to rectify his
drug dependency issues - having been released from the prison's drug program on
three occasions; and has not sought mental health treatment - though he suffers
..t)

from mental health issues.

27. Ms. Bess and the child have continuously lived with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Bess,
since the time of her separation from Mr. Cronin. Mr. and Mrs. Bess have provided
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for the child financially during that time. Mr. and Mrs. Bess intend to continue to
support the child financially.

28. Mr. Bess is employed and is and has been able to provide financially for the child.
However, for a short period of time in 2012 and 2013 when Ms. Bess was briefly
unemployed, Ms. Bess received state assistance in the form of food stamps and
Medicaid.

29. Ms. Bess has not remarried and there is no imminent adoption.

30. Mr. Cronin has never physically injured the child.

31. The child is not being treated by a mental health therapist and no expert testimony
as to the psychological or emotional condition of the child was presented at trial.

32. Petitioner has met her burden as to the following grounds for termination:

a. Mr. Cronin has abandoned Griffin in that he has failed to communicate with the
child by telephone or otherwise in over 6 months.

b. Mr. Cronin has neglected the child in that he is incarcerated as a result of a
conviction of a felony the sentences of such that the length would deprive the
child of a normal home for one year and that there is a history of violent
behavior.
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c.

Mr. Cronin is unfit in that the crime that he committed is of such a nature to
prove his unfitness in caring for this child's emotional health and development.

d. Mr. Cronin has made less than token efforts in support or communication in that
his lack of involvement in the child's life over the past few years are a result of
his actions.

e. Mr. Cronin has only made token efforts to avoid being an unfit parent.

33. Petitioner has failed to meet her burden that termination is in this child's best
interest because:

a. The lack of individual to step in to replace the role of the parent legally.

b. The child could benefit from a positive, loving, nurturing relationship with Mr.
Cronin and Mr. Cronin's extended family.

c. The lack of evidence that a relationship with Mr. Cronin's extended family is or
would be a detriment to the child.

d. There is no evidence of psychological or emotional damage from child's previous
relationship with Mr. Cronin.

e. The District Court in the divorce action did not find it necessary to cut-off contact
between the minor and Mr. Cronin after becoming aware of the October 2010
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incidents and entered less restrictive orders that preserved the parent-child
relationship.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Under Utah Code §78A-6-507(1}(a), Mr. Cronin has abandoned the child.

2. Under Utah Code §78A-6-507(1}(b), Mr. Cronin has neglected the child.

3. Under Utah Code §78A-6-507(1)(c), Mr. Cronin is unfit.

4. Under Utah Code §78A-6-507(1)(f)(ii), Mr. Cronin has made only token efforts to
support of communicate with the child.

5. Under Utah Code §78A-6-507(1)(f)(ii), Mr. Cronin has made only token efforts to
avoid being an unfit parent.

6. Under Utah Code §78A-6-503, termination would not be in this child's best interest.
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Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the
following order:

ORDER

1. Petitioner's Verified Petition to Terminate Parental Rights is dismissed.

THIS SHALL CONSTITUTE A FINAL ORDER FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL.

Dated this

IS

day o f ~ 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order was emailed or mailed to the following on May 15, 2015.
Paul W. Mortensen
Attorney for Desiree Dawn Bess
8 East Broadway, Suite 740
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
paulm@hmlawslc.com

Camille Wight
Guardian ad Litem
135 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321
camillew@utcourts.gov

Joshua Letoice Cronin
c/o Utah State Prison
14425 Bitterbrush Lane
Draper, UT 84020

Destin Christiansen
Judicial Assistant
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